Yesterday, 29th
January 2014,
the Centre was pleased to welcome Dr. Gareth Davies
(St. Annes College, Oxford University) to the seventh of the Centre’s 2013-2014
seminar series. In what was a truly thought-provoking lecture, Dr. Davies discussed ‘Taming Disaster:
Fatalism and Mastery in American Disaster Management, 1800-2013.’ Below is this
listener’s brief summary of the lecture.
Marine One above the decimated city of New
Orleans following Hurricane Katrina, 2005
When President George W. Bush flew over flood-ravaged
New Orleans immediately after Hurricane Katrina in 2005, opting not to
land for a closer look, it fuelled public sentiment that his administration was
not being proactive in the disaster that had taken lives and destroyed so much
property. Bush acknowledged as much in his memoirs. Indeed, as Hurricane Sandy in 2012 illuminated, when
both presidential candidates effectively had to cancel planned campaign stops
and all eyes pivoted to how President Barack Obama would respond, Presidential visits matter in times
of disasters. But has this always been the case? Has it always been the federal
government’s responsibility to react with all the resources at its disposal
when natural disasters strike?
According to Dr. Gareth Davies in his ‘Taming Disaster’
talk, the answer is no. In the Early American Republic there were very few
tools to draw from to combat catastrophe and the lack of communications and
governmental structures meant that response was limited. For example, in the
1811-12 Missouri Earthquakes, which remain the most powerful earthquakes to hit
the eastern United States in recorded history, territories were decimated and
the extreme ruralness of these rugged frontier lands meant that word of it got
out slowly. There was no expectation of governmental assistance at the
time but rather it was religious groups, believing these disasters to be the
work of God, who would raise money and assist when they could.
After the Civil War, the federal government began to
take a larger role in disaster prevention and assistance, but the expectation
was still on local organisations and philanthropic efforts. Thus, the government
played a role as part of a massive national collective, with the growth in
newspapers raising awareness and the strides in technology improving prevention
tools. By the Progressive Era, people began to
turn to local governments to respond. For example, following the 1900
Galveston, Texas hurricane that destroyed one third of the property in the area,
many people were dissatisfied with the way local governments responded, but
people did not turn to the federal government or the president. Instead, the
hurricane triggered the mobilization of an important movement to reform local
government since it was viewed as the locus of response. The Red Cross too
increased its role, playing a massive part in assisting those affected by the
1927 Mississippi floods.
So then, when did the people start
looking to the President to provide leadership in response to disasters? Although
President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal initiatives begin to bureaucratise the
nature of disaster prevention and response, even President Dwight Eisenhower
did not visit the Louisiana coast in 1957 when Hurricane Audrey wreaked havoc,
killing some 500 people, nor did he feel compelled to do so. As Dr. Davies
argued, it was during the Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon presidencies that the
decisive change took place.
Accordingly,
one of the key turning points in expectations that the President respond to
disaster was following Hurricane Betsy in September 1965. Although initially
disinclined to visit the site, but eventually persuaded to do so based on
political considerations by Louisiana Senator Russell Long, who had recently become
the Senate Majority Whip, President Johnson’s response was unprecedented. Betsy
was a Category 4 storm with wind gusts near 160 mph that came ashore on
September 9, 1965. New Orleans was hit with 110 mph winds, a storm surge around
10 feet, and heavy rain. After the storm passed, Senator Long called Johnson
and urged him to tour the devastated areas. Long told Johnson of the severe
damaged done to his own home that had nearly killed his family. Johnson, along
with the heads of the Office of Emergency Planning, the Army Corps of
Engineers, the Small Business Administration, the Department of Agriculture,
and the Surgeon General, arrived in New Orleans five hours after talking to Long.
After seeing the dreadful suffering and damage from his plane, Johnson said
upon arrival, ‘I am here because I want to see with my own eyes what the
unhappy alliance of wind and water have done to this land and its good people.’
Indeed,
within hours of Betsy, Johnson was in the
city, making surprise visits to shelters, offering encouragements to the city’s
newly homeless residents, saying:
Today at 3 o’clock
when Senator Long and Congressman Boggs and Congressman Willis called me on
behalf of the entire Louisiana delegation, I put aside all the problems on my
desk to come to Louisiana as soon as I could. I have observed from flying over
your city how great the catastrophe is that you have experienced. Human
suffering and physical damage are measureless. I’m here this evening to pledge
to you the full resources of the federal government to Louisiana to help repair
as best we can the injury that has been done by nature.
As
Dr. Davies highlighted (with a rather spot on attempt at LBJ’s voice), when
making one particular visit, and by illuminating his face with a flashlight, Johnson
told the audience, ‘I’m your president and I’m here to help.’
Dr.
Davies argued that although Johnson’s response to Betsy probably did not
significantly affect the expectations that Americans in general had of
presidential disaster leadership, it did set significant precedents including
the allocation of federal funds to relieve individual disaster victims and a
massive, federally funded hurricane defence system for New Orleans. Both
measures were included in the ‘Betsy Bill’ drafted by the Louisiana delegation
following the disaster, which likely would not have passed without Johnson’s
backing. Dr. Davies then drew an interesting parallel between Johnson’s response
to Betsy and George W. Bush’s response to Hurricane Katrina – which Bush admits
in his autobiography was severely lacking in comparison. Here is an insightful op-ed about ‘LBJ’s
political hurricane’ from the NY Times.[1]
Moreover, Dr. Davies demonstrated that amidst the height of the presidential campaign in
1972, Richard Nixon was sharply criticised for his response to Hurricane Agnes
that affected numerous eastern states, particularly Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania
Democratic Governor Milton Shapp, Democratic Presidential Candidate George McGovern
and others seized on the opportunity to criticise Nixon for what they called
the government’s incompetent response. Nixon moved quickly to mitigate the
damage, but was only able to do so when he took the reins and choreographed the
government’s response from the White House. With this politicisation of the
government’s response, the President had now effectively become the ‘Responder-in-Chief.’
This expectation of presidential response has only increased
with time, and ultimately can have an adverse effect on a president’s image depending
on how he reacts. For example, in 1992, when Hurricane Andrew devastated parts
of Florida, Democratic presidential candidate Bill Clinton toured the most
devastated portions of Florida, getting media coverage as he hugged and shared
tears with people made homeless by the storm. President George H.W. Bush
visited, as well, though media reports said Bush didn't come close to
displaying the 'feel your pain' empathy Clinton did. Here
then, one is able to see an example of the importance and development in the politics of disaster
response over time.
Throughout his talk, Dr. Davies used the changing responses
to natural disasters over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
to explore how, why, and when American expectations of government have grown,
ending by highlighting that the President’s
role as ‘Responder-in-Chief’ has only really assumed grand proportions in the
modern presidency. By interweaving both politics and natural
disasters, Dr. Davies’ work represents the best form of historical enquiry, and
the ability to use natural disasters as a way to unveil a narrative on the
changing nature of the federal government is both illuminating and intriguing.
With Dr. Davies currently turning this research into a book, the finished
product is bound to be nothing but fascinating.
By Joe Ryan-Hume
PGR at the University of Glasgow
The Centre’s seminar series continues
with Dr. Eithne Quinn (University of Manchester) ‘In the Heat of the Night (Norman
Jewison, 1967) and Racial Politics in Post-Civil Rights Act Hollywood.’ This will be held on Wednesday 12th February
2014 in Room 208, 2 University Gardens, at 5:15pm. All
very welcome!
